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The Syrian Conflict: Proxy War, Pyrrhic




The Syrian conflict presents as a case that has been well‐studied in the
power‐sharing literature. It is typically coded as an ethno‐sectarian civil war
moving towards a decisive military victory by an authoritarian regime and thus
unlikely to end in a power‐sharing agreement. Yet Syria’s experience offers
important insights into the effects of new conflict environments on prospects for
power‐sharing in ‘hard’ cases. Syria’s conflict exhibits attributes and is
unfolding in an environment that requires rethinking simplistic correlations
between the military and political outcomes of civil wars. Moreover, the form of
political settlement that emerges in Syria may also complicate assumptions
about the ability of victors to shape the terms of post‐war settlements
unilaterally. Whether a power‐sharing agreement is reached in Syria – however
remote the prospects for that might be – will be determined by factors that
underscore the impact changing conflict contexts can have on how civil wars end.
Introduction
At first glance, the Syrian conflict presents as a case that has been well‐studied in
the power‐sharing literature. The conflict is typically coded as an ethno‐sectarian
civil war moving towards a decisive military victory by an incumbent regime and
thus unlikely to end in a power‐sharing agreement (Downes 2004). This
conclusion is mirrored in comments by senior officials of Bashar al‐Assad’s
regime affirming their intention to retain an unfettered hold on power. Syria’s
experience of civil war thus seems to confirm the widely held view that
power‐sharing agreements are more likely when no side in a conflict can prevail
on the battlefield (Gent 2011).
Moreover, the near victory of an incumbent regime that is both exclusionary
and authoritarian renders the prospect of a power‐sharing agreement even more
remote. In much of the literature, the likelihood of reaching and sustaining
such agreements hinges on the extent to which they provide all sides with
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the incentive to cooperate. They also require that a victor be able to commit
credibly to sharing power with former adversaries (Fearon and Laitin 2008;
Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Where the possibilities for an inclusive
post‐conflict settlement are low, as in Syria, and where a regime has a track
record of violating previous reconciliation agreements, insurgents have little
to gain from entering into a power‐sharing arrangement. Similarly, the Assad
regime has questioned the ability of the opposition to make credible
commitments, describing it as too fractured to act on any promises it might
make in the course of negotiations. The strategic logics of both the Assad
regime and the Syrian opposition appear to limit the possibility that a
power‐sharing agreement will emerge as a pathway out of a brutal,
decade‐long civil war. Indeed, Syria’s circumstances seem to fit neatly with
the recent global reversion to a grim historical norm. Following a brief
period from 1990–2010, when the odds appeared to improve for intra‐state
wars to end at the bargaining table rather than on the battlefield, such
conflicts are once again more likely to be resolved militarily than through
negotiated outcomes (Howard and Stark 2017/2018; Pillar 1983).
Contingent Victories and Unstable Settlements
On further reflection, however, the dismal prospects for a power‐sharing
agreement in Syria raise meaningful questions for scholars of civil war,
peacebuilding, and conflict resolution. Most important is the question of
whether longstanding assumptions about the conditions most conducive to
power‐sharing remain valid as conflict environments change, both from within
and from without. Whether or not we characterize them as ‘new wars’,
‘surrogate wars’, or ‘proxy wars’ as I do here, today’s conflicts in the Middle
East, including in Syria, exhibit attributes and unfold in environments that
require rethinking such assumptions (Kaldor 2012). It is possible that military
victory remains a decisive variable in determining the likelihood of a
power‐sharing agreement. Ultimately, Syria’s experience seems likely to
validate this claim. Yet Syria may arrive at a familiar destination by a pathway
that challenges simplistic correlations between the military and political
outcomes of civil wars. Moreover, the form of political settlement that emerges
in Syria may also complicate assumptions about the ability of victors to shape
the terms of post‐war settlements unilaterally. Whether a power‐sharing
agreement is reached in Syria – however remote the prospects for that might be
– will be determined by factors that underscore the impact changing conflict
contexts can have on how civil wars end.
Three features of Syria’s civil war in particular reflect these changes and
have a bearing on whether and how a power‐sharing agreement might take
shape. First, military victory has not strengthened the Assad regime’s
legitimacy. Loyalist strongholds along the coast have suffered extraordinary
losses over the past nine years, and are being hit hard by economic
conditions that have pushed the vast majority of Syrians into poverty. Areas
formerly held by the opposition, including in southern Syria, remain defiant
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and continue to contest the authority of the regime. In the northeast of the
country, empowered and mobilized Kurdish communities continue to seek a
negotiated political agreement with the Assad regime that includes elements
of self‐rule. Military victory may well privilege the interests of the Assad
regime in defining a post‐war settlement. Nonetheless, its standing as victor
will not give the regime unilateral authority to define the terms of such a
settlement, or to ignore its lack of legitimacy, the interests of its external
patrons, or the external resources available to its opponents and their
sponsors, first and foremost among them Turkey.
Second, civil war in Syria has not played out as an intra‐state conflict neatly
contained within national borders. It is a proxy war that has become intensely
transnational, with high levels of regional spillover and engagement by regional
and international actors, both state and non‐state actors alike. In addition, the
conflict has generated significant spill‐in, not only by terrorist organizations like
the Islamic State (ISIS) and al‐Qaeda, but also by a major regional power:
Turkey. Turkey now occupies parts of northwest Syria and has placed some of
these areas under the authority of the provincial governor of its own southern
province of Gaziantep.1 As a result, the governments backing local proxies –
including Russia, Turkey, and Iran – have a direct stake in the terms on which
Syria’s conflict ends. And as is evident in the diplomatic efforts to achieve a
political solution to the conflict, the interests of the leading external sponsors of
the regime and of the opposition regarding power‐sharing are not neatly aligned
with those of the regime in Damascus, in Russia’s case, or of opposition
factions, in the case of Turkey.
Third, the Assad regime’s pyrrhic victory has been achieved at a price that the
regime cannot bear alone. Conflict has wreaked havoc on Syrian society and
devastated its economy. The World Bank has estimated the cost of Syria’s
post‐conflict reconstruction at some USD 200 billion. Therefore, even if the
Assad regime regards victory as little more than an opportunity to impose an
authoritarian peace, it faces significant fiscal constraints on its capacity to do so.
These financial constraints, combined with the influence that external actors can
bring to bear during the transition from war to peace, will affect the regime’s
calculus concerning the trade‐offs associated with an imposed authoritarian
peace versus a power‐sharing agreement.
Thus far, the Syrian conflict has not become Russia’s ‘quagmire’, as once
predicted by President Obama (Bell and Perry 2015). However, to avoid
finding itself saddled with the economic burden of funding reconstruction,
or with the prospect of propping up an insolvent client regime indefinitely,
Russia has lobbied aggressively for the easing of Western sanctions and
for the European Union (EU) to provide reconstruction assistance. The
EU, however, insists that reconstruction support will only be forthcoming
if the Assad regime undertakes a ‘meaningful and inclusive political
transition’, one that will inevitably dilute the regime’s authority (European
Council, Council of the European Union 2018). For Russia, therefore, the
trade‐offs associated with power‐sharing are different from those for the
Assad regime.
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To the Victor, the Spoils? Power‐Sharing as a Second‐Best Outcome of
Conflict
Military gains have secured the Assad regime’s survival. Nonetheless, ample
incentives exist for the regime to enter into some form of power‐sharing
agreement. Importantly, some of the political benefits of doing so would result
even if the regime proves insincere about its commitment to sharing power.
Research has shown that the winners in civil wars, including authoritarian
regimes, benefit when they exploit power‐sharing frameworks instrumentally.
According to Mukherjee (2006), when civil wars end in a decisive military
victory for either governments or insurgents, governments disproportionately
gain support and legitimacy from the offer of a power‐sharing agreement, while
insurgents lose support and legitimacy. Jarstad and Nilsson (2018:180) similarly
find that regime type matters for the kind of power‐sharing agreements that are
reached between former belligerents. Authoritarian regimes, they argue, are
most likely to ‘implement pacts that do not pose a real threat to their authority,
such as symbolic representation in a power‐sharing government’. In fact, this
appears to be precisely the form of power‐sharing envisioned by Russia: an
arrangement that will ensure the Assad regime’s continuity, preserve the full
scope of its authority, strengthen its claims to legitimacy, meet EU requirements
for the provision of financial aid for reconstruction, and assist Russia in
stabilizing a client regime while burnishing its diplomatic credentials as the lead
architect of a political settlement.
Facing a legitimacy deficit and a resurgent if diffuse and still low‐level
insurgency in recaptured areas, with its economy crippled by war and economic
sanctions, isolated diplomatically from the West, with an occupying power
controlling pockets of its territory and its most important patron supporting a
Potemkin political settlement, the Assad regime’s cost‐benefit analysis of a
power‐sharing agreement may not be as straightforward as its public positions
suggest. Moreover, while the regime remains outwardly hostile to the possibility
of sharing power, it is attentive to the risks of alienating its Russian patron and
of being labelled a spoiler in diplomatic efforts undertaken by the United
Nations (UN). Given these circumstances, the regime’s first‐order preference –
to reimpose its monopoly rule over a unified Syrian state on all Syrian territory
– must be weighed against the potential gains of accepting a second‐best
outcome in the form of a power‐sharing agreement.
To date these incentives have not proven sufficient to change the Assad
regime’s calculus. Politically, it has remained recalcitrant in its response to
diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Despite its
dependence on Russian military and economic support, the regime has rejected
UNSC 2254, the UN Security Council resolution backed by Russia that
underpins the current Geneva II talks (Arab Center for Research and Policy
Studies 2016), and it regularly rebuffs Russian diplomatic initiatives that it
views as infringing on Syrian sovereignty. Despite the potential gains it would
realize from a political settlement, the Assad regime thus remains steadfast in
its determination to bring about the failure of the Geneva process. Russian
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pressure on Syria to at least play along with the talks has not persuaded it to
change its behaviour.
Militarily, and consistent with its antipathy towards diplomatic initiatives, the
Assad regime has systematically undermined efforts to contain and de‐escalate
armed violence. Beginning in the second half of 2019, it expanded operations
aimed at retaking northwest Idlib province, the only remaining insurgent
stronghold. Its offensives escalated throughout spring 2020, violating
de‐escalation agreements reached between Russia, Turkey, and Iran, causing the
mass displacement of civilians, and provoking a large‐scale military
intervention by Turkey.
Empowered Sovereigns, Disengaged Democracies, and Imposed
Power‐Sharing
The Assad regime’s refusal to engage seriously in negotiations over a
power‐sharing agreement – even at the cost of deepening an economic crisis
that threatens to destabilize the country, extending the life of economic
sanctions, prolonging Turkey’s occupation, and forcing the regime into a costly
military operation to retake the remaining opposition strongholds – is a telling
indicator of the severe impediments to a power‐sharing arrangement in cases
like Syria. Such obstacles have been amplified, however, by changes in the
broader geo‐strategic landscape within which violent conflicts like those in
Syria unfold.
If some of the factors inhibiting the chances for power‐sharing in Syria have
been well mapped out in the literature – including the presence of a government
dominated by a sectarian minority that has framed conflict in zero‐sum,
existential terms, and a military balance of power that heavily favours the
incumbent regime over the insurgents – others have not yet been fully taken
into account. These include, in particular, the convergence of the Assad regime
and its external sponsors around a shared commitment to a maximalist
conception of sovereignty.
The Assad regime, with Russia’s support, has embraced and stridently defends
a rigid, expansive conception of its status as sovereign authority over all of Syria’s
territory. Throughout the Syrian conflict, officials and regional specialists have
floated ideas and proposals for various forms of decentralization and
territorially‐based formulas for power‐sharing to bring the conflict to a close.
All have been rejected by the regime. Proposals for power‐sharing are
characterized by the regime as infringing on its sovereignty, and as threats to
the territorial integrity of the country being advanced by external opponents
whose real purpose is to weaken the regime. Instead, it has aggressively asserted
its sovereign prerogatives in international institutions such as the UN, applied
them in justifying its heavy‐handed control over the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, and references sovereignty and international law in calling for an end
to Western sanctions. Further, Russia and the Assad regime justify the presence
of Russian forces in Syria, along with those of Iran, Hezbollah, and an
assortment of mercenaries from other countries, on the grounds that they were
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requested by a sovereign government and are therefore legitimate and lawful. The
presence of US and Turkish forces, on the other hand, is characterized as illegal on
the same grounds.
What the Syrian case highlights, therefore, is that in contrast to the immediate
post‐Cold War period, in which ideas like Responsibility to Protect gained
legitimacy – signalling an international willingness to acknowledge the limits
of sovereignty – the past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of
harder‐edged views of sovereignty as an inviolable feature of stateness. This
shift has gone hand‐in‐hand with the growing influence of authoritarian
regimes in the international system and the rise of nativist‐populist political
forces around the world, including in the US and among EU member states. It
has been accompanied, as well, by a declining commitment to norms of
democratization among Western states, a factor that Howard and Stark argue
has depressed the likelihood that a civil war will end with a negotiated
settlement (2017/2018:127).
Like the case of Bahrain explored by Simon Mabon in this special
feature (2020), what the Syrian case represents is a conflict in which internal
dynamics mitigating against power‐sharing have converged with shifts in the
international system that reinforce domestic factors. It is possible, if not likely,
that no power‐sharing agreement would be reached in Syria even in the absence
of these shifts. Their presence makes such an outcome even more remote than
might otherwise have been the case.
Nonetheless, the Syrian conflict is not over, and it is not yet possible entirely to
rule out a power‐sharing agreement of some kind. In fact, Syria’s experience
offers some useful insights into how non‐negotiated, imposed power‐sharing
frameworks might emerge as the result of external intervention in a protracted
civil war. Such an outcome would not be unique to Syria. The international
system is full of hybrid forms of imposed power‐sharing that cannot be ruled
out as possible features of an outcome in the Syrian case. Perhaps the most
common are imposed, coercive, or de facto forms of power‐sharing, in which
external actors engage with local authorities directly and against the wishes of a
recognized central government.
We see many different forms of this kind of power‐sharing in the international
system. At one end of the spectrum is the continued recognition of states or
territories whose sovereignty is contested by other governments. This includes
Taiwan and Northern Cyprus, which in most respects behave as sovereign states
yet acknowledge that their status as such is anomalous and subject to change in
the future. Further along the spectrum are cases like the Kurdish region of Iraq,
where the scope of direct engagement between outside powers and local
authorities exceeds what might be expected on the basis of Iraq’s constitutional
arrangement which extends elements of self‐rule to Kurdish authorities. Even
further along the spectrum are cases in which third parties recognize and
engage with forces challenging a recognized government. This has occurred in
the cases of Venezuela, Kosovo prior to its independence, and with international
recognition of the Syrian opposition as ‘a’ representative but not ‘the’
representative of the Syrian people.
Steven Heydemann: The Syrian Conflict: Proxy War, Pyrrhic Victory, and Power‐Sharing Agreements
158
Are such cases truly examples of power‐sharing? One feature that might assist
in answering this question includes whether external actors implicitly or explicitly
recognize a local authority as representing a legitimate source of governance.
Extending elements of sovereignty to a local or regional actor whose legitimacy
is rejected by the recognized sovereign government can produce imposed or
coercive forms of power‐sharing. In such arrangements, the recognized
government is excluded from a given territory and forced to accept, if not to
acknowledge as lawful or legitimate, that a local authority is acting as a
sovereign within the space it controls. A second core distinction might arise in
cases where an external actor invests heavily in state‐building and governance
activities within a territory that is nominally under the authority of a recognized
sovereign government. Turkey’s role in northern Syria may be a case in point.
The Turkish government has invested in building health, education, security,
communications, and finance infrastructure in the areas of Syria it now controls.
The long‐term intentions of the Turkish government in making these
investments are not entirely clear. How long Turkey might remain in Syria is
anyone’s guess. Yet over time, we may see forms of local governance emerge
that acquire the features of a regional authority with which the Assad regime
will be forced to contend.
An Open‐Ended Denouement
Syria’s civil war is unlikely to be the exception that proves the rule. An
ethno‐sectarian conflict in which an authoritarian regime led by a sectarian
minority is on the cusp of military victory is a poor candidate for a negotiated
political settlement. Yet as I have tried to show, the strategic choices that
confront a likely victor, even in circumstances such as Syria’s, are not
necessarily cut‐and‐dried. If a changing international landscape has empowered
the regime and weakened its opponents, there remain factors in play that could
compel the regime’s compliance with demands for power‐sharing, despite its
resistance. Both the Assad regime and its external patrons will pay a high price
for their unwillingness to engage more seriously with international efforts to
secure a power‐sharing deal of some sort. The uncertain implications of the
Covid‐19 pandemic may further increase pressure on the regime to respond to
external pressures for a political settlement. And, as of mid‐2020, we cannot
rule out either the possibility that Turkey will succeed in imposing a
power‐sharing deal as its price for withdrawal from the territories it occupies in
northwest Syria, or that the Kurdish PYD will extract a measure of self‐rule in
exchange for acceptance of the regime’s sovereignty over Syria’s northeastern
territory. Should economic conditions become sufficiently dire, Russia may also
become more responsive to the EU’s demands for a meaningful political
transition as the trade‐off for critical financial aid. However unlikely these
possibilities may be, they highlight the more complex strategic context that is
shaping the decisions of combatants about the costs and benefits of
power‐sharing arrangements, and they underscore the importance of taking into
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account how conflict contexts have changed when analysing and theorizing about
the likelihood of such outcomes.
Notes
1 On Turkish governance in northwest Syria, see Yesiltas et al. 2017.
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